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NOTES
An exception to preserve health, whether achieved by statutory reform or judicial interpretation, is clearly desirable. It is not only sound
from an ethical and medical viewpoint, but it is at the same time in keeping with existing mores. The distinction between saving the mother's
life and preserving her health seems both tenuous and artificial. Not
only is it frequently difficult to ascertain what constitutes a peril to life
as opposed to impairment of health, but it is equally difficult to rationalize why one should be morally acceptable while the other is not. Therapeutic abortion as defined by the Bourne Case provides a flexible exception which can meet a variety of contingencies. With increasing knowledge in the field of mental health, it is apparent that an exception to preserve health would allow induced abortion for psychiatric indications as
well as for preservation of physical health. The much discussed rape
and insantity cases would thereby be provided for.
The high incidence of illegal abortion has had tragic consequences,
but, unfortunately, resort to the legislative process is not an automatic
panacea. Legal reforms which will immediately correct the evils of nonenforcement are so antagonistic to the basic purpose of the law as to be
undesirable, while proposals such as expanded therapeutic exception,
which are consistent with the underlying rationale of the law, will ameliorate the situation only slightly. Prosecutors should avail themselves of
every opportunity to enforce existing laws, but success depends on the
co-operation of the public, a factor over which the prosecutor has no control. The ability of the legislature to deal with the problem is similarly
dependent on public opinion. The result of this anomalous situation is
that the status quo will remain undisturbed until either public opinion
becomes aroused sufficiently to enforce abortion laws, or existing mores
change enough to make legalized abortion a legislative feasibility.

PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUES FOR BELATED ATTACKS ON
JUDGMENTS IN INDIANA
It is one objective of our legal system to bring litigation to a timely
and final conclusion. However, correction of unjust decisions cannot be
completely subverted to the interest in finality. Some method must be
devised which permits the courts to balance the interest in finality and
that of correcting erroneous judgments. How great must be the hardship before the law will sacrifice finality to prevent injustice? Several
factors must be weighed in making such a decision; the length of time
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the judgment stands, possible injury to the prevailing party and third
person, and culpability or negligence of the parties involved.
Relief from judgments, formerly supplied by ancillary common law
and equitable writs, is now extensively controlled in Indiana by various
statutes. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide similar relief
under Rule 60(b). The substantive content and procedural aspects of
these available remedies may be determined only by considering an extensive array of case and statutory materials.
Mistake, Surprise, Iuadvertence, or Excusable Neglect
In Indiana, a judgment may be set aside under Burns 2-1068 when
taken against a party through mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.1 The majority of the cases decided under this statute are
those seeking relief from default judgments, but the statute is also applicable to judgments rendered in litigated cases, although actions to set
aside a judgment rendered in a litigated case rarely arise.2 For example,
1. "The court shall relieve a party from a judgment taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, on complaint filed and notice issued, as in original actions within two [2] years from and after the date of judgment,
except where judgment on default has been rendered in a suit to quiet title to real
estate in which case the complaint for relief from judgment on default shall be filed
within one [1] year from and after the date of judgment quieting title, and if the
complaint is not filed within the period of time herein prescribed, then the action shall
be forever barred; . . ." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1068 (Burns 1946).
This proceeding has been declared comparable to a motion for new trial. State
ex t-el. Krodel v. Gilkinson, 209 Ind. 213, 198 N.E. 323 (1935). While it has some
characteristics of a motion for new trial, there are several material differences between
the two remedies. Motion for new trial may raise questions of law and may determine
questions arising out of the original cause. The complaint to vacate raises only questions of fact and is concerned only with matters not raised in the original cause. State
ex tel. Beckham v. Vandeburgh Circuit Court, 233 Ind. 368, 119 N.E.2d 713 (1954).
Although notice is required, it may be waived. Flaherty v. Stalcup, 121 Ind. App.
659, 101 N.E.2d 820 (1951); Swartz v. Swartz, 121 Ind. App. 635, 101 N.E.2d 822
(1951) ; Gilmer v. Hurst, 117 Ind. App. 102, 69 N.E.2d 608 (1946).
Necessary parties to the action to set aside include those parties having a "unity of
interest" in the action to vacate. It is not sufficient that the parties had identical interests in the subject matter of the original action, they must also have like interest in
the relief sought in the proceedings to vacate. Thus, unity of interest includes an interest in both the subject matter of the original cause and in the relief demanded at the
subsequent proceeding to vacate. See for example, Durre v. Brown, 7 Ind. App. 127,
34 N.E. 579 (1893), where the original judgment was rendered by default against two
parties, one party sought relief under Burns 2-1068. Applicant alleged that she was so
ill at the time the summons was read to her, that she could not understand its import
and did not know that she was a defendant in the original action. Thus the subject
matter of the action to set aside is the applicant's excusable neglect due to illness. The
other defendant against whom the judgment was rendered was not ill and had no reason to contend that the judgment against him should be set aside because of the applicant's illness. Therefore, there was not unity of interest between the original defendants
in the subsequent suit to vacate.
2. Globe Mining Co. v. Oak Ridge Coal Co., 204 Ind. 11, 177 N.E. 868 (1932);
Syfers v. Keiser, 31 Ind. App. 6, 66 N.E. 1021 (1903).
This statute relates only to civil actions. It does not apply to special proceedings
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where a litigant was deprived of his right to a motion for new trial and
appeal because of the judge's failure to notify the applicant's attorney,
after agreeing to do so, that he was handing down the judgment, the
judgment was vacated. 3 Non-appearance is the chief cause that motivates application for relief under this statute. However, the problem
involved in this section is in determining whether the specific circumstances which combined to result in non-appearance, or in some other
cause, are such as the court will denominate mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.
What constitutes mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.4 The trial
court is accorded a wide area of discretion, and as a result there are few
fixed rules available to guide the researching attorney in determining
whether his facts constitute grounds for relief under this statute. This
is exemplified in the case of First Nat'l. Bank v. Stillwell,5 where the
court said, "No rule can be fixed by which to determine in all cases
whether the neglect is excusable, or whether the proper degree of diligence has been exercised. Each case must depend on its own particular
facts and "circumstances, and can seldom serve as precedent for another
case depending on different facts."
A survey of the cases in search of what constitutes excusable neglect,
etc., avails little. The only rules capable of formulation are broad, general ones and the results within these rules fluctuate with the changing
of seemingly insignificant facts. Generally, when a settlement is made
between the parties, failure to appear and defend is excusable neglect.'
For example, the opposing attorneys in one case reached a definite agreement of compromise after the complaint had been filed, and the plaintiff's attorney agreed not to take a default judgment but to have the case
dismissed. The defendant's attorney relied on these promises and failed
to appear; the plaintiff's attorney allowed a default judgment to be entered against the defendant. Relief from the default judgment was
granted.7 But when one party agrees to ignore an order of the court
unless they are made applicable by special authorizing statute. Thus, it is not applicable
to findings of the Industrial Board. Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Young, 70 Ind. App. 172,
121 N.E. 94 (1918).
3. Globe Mining Co. v. Oak Ridge Coal Co., supra note 2. Contra, Stampfer v.
Peter Hand Brewing Co., 67 Ind. App. 485, 118 N.E. 138 (1917).
4. Hoag v. Jeffers, 201 Ind. 249, 159 N.E. 753 (1929) ; United Taxi Co. v. Dilworth, 106 Ind. App. 627, 20 N.E.2d 699 (1939).
5. 50 Ind. App. 226, 231, 98 N.E. 151, 152 (1912).
6. McGaughey v. Woods, 92 Ind. 296 (1883); Dallin v. Mclvor, 12 Ind. App. 150,
39 N.E. 765 (1894) ; Hoag v. Old People's Mut. Benefit Soc'y, 1 Ind. App. 28, 27 N.E.
438 (1890) ; accord, Nord v. Marty, 56 Ind. 531 (1877) ; Riddle v. McNaughton, 88 Ind.
App. 352, 163 N.E. 846 (1928) ; Dennis v. Scanlon 66 Ind. App. 453, 118 N.E. 370 (1918).
7. Hoag v. Old People's Mut. Benefit Soc'y, supra note 6.
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and suffers a default as a result, it is not excusable neglect. In one such
case the applicant's attorney attempted to avoid compliance with an order
of the court to answer by a certain date. The opposing attorneys agreed
that the applicant could take additional time in complying with the rule
to answer, the rule having been previously obtained by the adverse party.
The default taken because of non-compliance with the rule to answer
was not set aside.'
Void judgments may be successfully attacked under these proceedings.' This is not an attack on the court's jurisdiction, but is based on
the sound premise that non-appearance is excusable when no notice is
received." Likewise, where the judgment is not void, but where the defendant receives no actual notice and has no knowledge of the summons,
the cause is brought within the purview of the statute."
Failure of an attorney to appear without excuse is not grounds for
setting aside a judgment under these proceedings." But relief has been
granted where the excuse was weak. For example, when the applicant's
attorney told him not to appear until he was notified by the attorney, and
the attorney later "became very busy" and forgot to file answers, thereby causing a default judgment to be entered, relief was granted.' 3 Other
cases have not been so lenient in vacating judgments taken through the
mistakes of attorneys. 4 For example, an attorney was retained to litigate a case in another county. He wrote the clerk of the court requesting
that his client's appearance be entered, but his stenographer inadvertently
omitted this request from the letter. Later, he dictated a letter to an
attorney in the town where the trial was to be held requesting legal representation for his client. This letter was not written through an oversight of his stenographer. The attorney was then called out of town and
upon his return, he learned that default judgment had been entered
against his client. This was held not to amount to excusable neglect, etc.'"
Some acts of third persons have constituted valid grounds for relief.
Where the applicant relied on his co-defendant's promise to obtain coun8. Daub v. Van Lundy, 67 Ind. App. 468, 118 N.E. 140 (1917).
9. Houk v. Barthold, 73 Ind. 21 (1880).
10. See Houk v. Barthold, note 9 supra.
11. Indiana v. Stultz, 208 Ind. 543, 196 N.E. 873 (1935) ; Indiana Travelers' Acc.
Ass'n v. Doherty, 70 Ind. App. 214, 123 N.E. 242 (1918) ; Kolb v. Raisnor, 17 Ind. App.
551, 47 N.E. 177 (1897).
12. Rastovaski v. Betz, 91 Ind. App. 5, 169 N.E. 926 (1930); Smith v. Heyns, 78
Ind. App. 565, 136 N.E. 563 (1922).
13. Anderson v. Leonard, 51 Ind. App. 14, 98 N.E. 891 (1912) ; accord, Masten v.
Indiana Car and Foundry Co., 25 Ind. App. 175, 57 N.E. 148 (1900).
14. Kreite v. Kreite, 93 Ind. 583 (1883) ; Houser v. Laughlin, 55 Ind. App. 563, 104
N.E. 309 (1913) ; Masten v. Indiana Car and Foundry Co., note 13 supra; Baltimore &
0. & C. Ry. v. Flinn, 2 Ind. App. 55, 28 N.E. 201 (1891).
15. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 42 Ind. App. 621, 86 N.E. 506 (1908).
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sel and defend the suit for both parties, but the co-defendant neglected
to inform the attorney that he was also to defend the applicant, and the
applicant was defaulted, relief was granted." Also where the applicant's
husband paid the plaintiff's attorney sums due on a street assessment
lien, but the attorney inadvertently failed to note the payment and the
applicant believed that the assessment had been paid until after the redemption period had expired, a decree which executed a deed to the plaintiff as a result of a sheriff's sale was set aside under Burns 2-1068.17
However, all mistakes of third persons are not cause for vacating judgment. Reliance upon the promise of the clerk of the court to keep the
applicant advised of all developments in the pending case which results
in default through an error of the clerk is not grounds for relief under
this statute.'" One cannot on the advice of his own attorney refuse to
appear and then utilize reliance upon this advice to obtain a vacation of
judgment.1 9 Nor can a defendant rely on erroneous advice of a sheriff2"
or the plaintiff's attorney2 and obtain relief on these grounds.
Illness of a litigant has been held to constitute excusable neglect
within the meaning of the statute.2 2 For example, where the applicant
was ill and unable to leave home, relief was granted, although she could
have engaged counsel through her husband who was not ill.22 However,
relief was denied when the defendant's nine month old child became so
ill as to require her constant attention and the applicant depended upon
her husband to arrange for her defense, which he neglected to do.2 It
seems well settled that insanity on the part of the applicant at the time
the judgment is rendered against him, when he is not represented by
guardian, amounts to excusable neglect.25
Ignorance of the litigant has been held grounds for relief under the
statute.
Where a German woman, barely able to speak or understand
English, was served with summons but failed to understand its import,
16. Neat v. Topp, 49 Ind. App. 512, 97 N.E. 578 (1912).
17. Richcreek v. Russell, 34 Ind. App. 217, 72 N.E. 617 (1904) ; accord, Hunter v.
Francis, 56 Ind. 460 (1877).
18. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griffin, 1 Ind. App. 46, 27 N.E. 113 (1890).
19. Lowe v. Hamilton, 132 Ind. 426, 31 N.E. 1117 (1892).
20. Bowen v. Bragunier, 88 Ind. 558 (1883).
21. Snipes v. Jones, 59 Ind. 251 (1877).
22. Comstock v. Whitworth, 75 Ind. 129 (1881); Ziegler v. Funkhauser, 42 Ind.
App. 428, 85 N.E. 984 (1908).
23. Comstock v. Whitworth, szpra note 22.
24. Schlemmer v. Rossler, 59 Ind. 326 (1877).
25. McClain v. Davis, 77 Ind. 419 (1881) ; Judd v. Gray, 156 Ind. 278, 286, 59 N.E.
849, 851 (1901) ; Dickerson v. Davis, 111 Ind. 433, 12 N.E. 145 (1887).
26. Thompson v. Herlow, 150 Ind. 450, 50 N.E. 474 (1898); Adams v. Citizens

State Bank, 70 Ind. 89 (1880).
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relief was granted." But where another German woman who was barely
able to speak or understand English was defaulted because a crosscomplaint was filed after the parties had reached an agreement in open
court and her attorney had withdrawn, it was held not to amount to excusable neglect.28 The decision was not predicated on the error of the
attorney in premature withdrawal, but upon the litigant's error of law,
her failure to seek legal advice and her reliance upon those who were
no better informed than she.
It is seen that conflicting and often irreconcilable results arise under
Burns 2-1068. This emphasizes the extreme importance of the surrounding circumstances of the particular case. The general areas outlined above must therefore be considered as merely examples, not definitive rules. Thus precedent cannot be relied upon too heavily, but situations may arise where the particular facts in question will be closely
analogous to one or more of the decided cases.
Judicial error is generally not grounds for relief under the statute.29
But a distinction is made in the cases between clerical errors, those which
were not a result of the exercise of the judgment of the court;"0 and
judicial errors, rulings on points of law and special findings of fact
which are a consequence of judgment exercised by the court.2 Clerical
error is a proper ground for relief,32 but judicial error is not."2
Mistakes of law committed by the litigant or his attorney are not
grounds for relief under the statute.2 4 But in practice the rule is of
doubtful utility because mistakes of law and fact are often so similar as
to be practically indistinguishable.3 Thus, the problem becomes one of
categorization, and in close cases the term mistake of law is merely a
label applied by the court to reach a result and is of little value as a legal
standard. However, it is clear that a litigant is not excused from informing himself of his legal rights, and a party who suffers a default
27. Thompson v. Herlow, supra note 26.
28. Nash v. Cars, 92 Ind. 216 (1883).
29. Center Township v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 110 Ind. 579, 10 N.E. 291 (1886) ; Lawler
v. Couch, 80 Ind. 369 (1881) ; Colvert v. Colvert, 95 Ind. App. 325, 180 N.E. 192 (1932).
30. Globe Mining Co. v. Oak Ridge Coal Co., 204 Ind. 11, 177 N.E. 868 (1932).
See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 220 (5th ed. 1925). See note 3 supra and accompanying

text.

31. Lawler v. Couch, 80 Ind. 369 (1881).

See 1 FREEMAN,

JUDGMENTS

§ 221 (5th

ed. 1925).
32. Globe Mining Co. v. Oak Ridge Coal Co. 204 Ind. 11, 177 N.E. 868 (1932).
33. See note 29 supra.
34. Carty v. Toro, 223 Ind. 1, 57 N.E.2d 434 (1944) ; Thompson v. Herlow, 150
Ind. 450, 50 N.E. 474 (1898) ; Thacker v. Thacker, 125 Ind. 489, 25 N.E. 595 (1890).
Certainly the wisdom of such a rule cannot be challenged. One who mistakes his
legal rights ought not be allowed another opportunity. A different rule would represent too great a threat to finality.
35. See notes 27 and 28 supra and accompanying text.
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judgment, mistakenly believing he has no defense, cannot be relieved."
Applicability of this rule has been limited to mistakes concerning legal
rights or defenses the applicant knew, or should have known, existed."
If the facts which constituted the defense were known but not believed
to be a defense it is a mistake of law. But where the facts were unknown
and are later discovered it is not a mistake of law and relief may be
allowed.
Although the discovery of new evidence is generally held not proper
grounds for relief under Burns 2-1068,"s such new evidence has been admitted to establish a mistake of fact sufficient to allow relief under this
statute. For example, in an original suit to quiet title, the plaintiff had
been a tenant by the entirety with her deceased husband. Defendants
were children of the deceased by a former marriage. The defendants
did not contest the suit because of the apparent legal right of the plaintiff. After judgment had been rendered, it was discovered that the
plaintiff had been married at the time she married the defendants' father.
The court set aside the judgment under Burns 2-1068."o The facts of
this case clearly indicate that this was newly discovered evidence, or material new matter, the proper remedy being review of judgment or complaint for a new trial. However, a valid claim was upheld in spite of
the technical error, and justice was done by overlooking mistakes in form.
This case does manifest one of the major advantages of Rule 60(b)
over the Indiana system. One seeking relief under Rule 60(b) need not
select the exact ground upon which the relief is sought. It is sufficient
if the facts constitute grounds for relief under any one of the six causes
set out in Rule 60(b). Therefore, an action cannot fail because of the
applicant's error'in selecting the wrong form. While the illustrated case
reached the right result, there are cases in Indiana that deny relief because it was sought by an improper remedy.4"
The complaint, under Burns 2-1068, must allege: (1) the nature of
the original cause of action ;41 (2) a meritorious defense ;42 and (3) facts
36. Thacker v. Thacker, 125 Ind. 489, 25 N.E. 595 (1890).
37. Wellinger v. Wellinger, 39 Ind. App. 60, 79 N.E. 214 (1906).
38. Hobbs v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 122 Ind. 180, 23 N.E. 714 (1889).

39. See note 37 supra.
40. See Hoag v. Jeffers 201 Ind. 249, 159 N.E. 753 (1929) ; Ross v. Banta, 140 Ind.
120, 34 N.E. 865 (1895); Ervin School Township v. Tapp. 121 Ind. 463, 23 N.E. 505
(1889) ; Masten v. Indiana Car and Foundry Co., 25 Ind. App. 175, 57 N.E. 148 (1900).
But see Michener v. Springfield Engine and Thresher Co., 142 Ind. 130, 40 N.E. 679

(1895).
41. Hall v. Durham, 116 Ind. 198, 18 N.E. 181 (1888).
42. Becker v. Tell City Bank, 142 Ind. 99 (1895) ; Swartz v. Swartz, 121 Ind. App.
635, 101 N.E.2d 822 (1951) ; Graves v. Kelly, 62 Ind. App. 164 (1916). As applied to
plaintiffs, the rule is that a valid cause of action must be alleged. Williams v. Kessler,
82 Ind. 183 (1882). The rationale of this requirement is that courts should not be re-
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showing mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.43 The
action is in the nature of a new proceeding, but where relief is erroneously pursued by motion, the technical error has been overlooked if the
adverse party received proper notice." The allegation must factually set
out a meritorious defense supported by affidavit,4 5 but counter-affidavits
are inadmissible on this point.46 However, where the defense has already
been made no meritorious defense need be alleged."
The requisite of
establishing surprise, mistake, excusable neglect or inadvertence points
up the primary objective of the litigation. Both parties may submit evidence on this issue by oral testimony, affidavit, or deposition.4
The
burden of proving the facts is on the party seeking relief ;9 however, any
doubt as to whether the proven facts constitute excusable grounds for
quired to do a useless thing. If the applicant has no valid defense (or cause of action),
then a vacation of the judgment and a subsequent trial on the merits would serve no
purpose.
43. Rooker v. Bruce, 171 Ind. 86, 85 N.E. 351 (1908) ; Swartz v. Swartz, 121 Ind.
App. 635, 101 N.E.2d 822 (1951).
44. Gilmer v. Hurst, 117 Ind. App. 102, 69 N.E.2d (1946) ; Isaacs v. Fletcher Am.
Nat'l Bank, 98 Ind. App. 111, 185 N.E. 154 (1933); Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n v.
Doherty, 70 Ind. App. 214, 123 N.E. 242 (1918).
In this situation, the court looks
through an error in form to reach the substance. The proceedings are summary in
nature, requiring no formal pleading beyond the complaint of the party seeking relief.
Graves v. Kelly, 62 Ind. App. 164, 112 N.E. 899 (1916). The court has an imperative
duty to set aside the judgment when it appears from the facts alleged and proved that
the applicant had the judgment taken against him through his mistake, surprise, excusable neglect or inadvertence. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n v. Doherty, supra; Daub
v. Van Lundy, 67 Ind. App. 468, 118 N.E. 140 (1917). A ruling of the court denying
relief under this statute is an absolute bar to another proceeding for the same purpose.
Moore v. Horner, 146 Ind. 287 (1896). The action is tried without a jury. State
ex rel. Hobbs v. Claycombe, 233 Ind. 247, 118 N.E.2d 489 (1954) ; and before the same
court that rendered judgment in the original cause. State ex rel. Beckham v. Vandeburgh
Circuit Court, 233 Ind. 368, 119 N.E.2d 813 (1954) ; Christ v. Jovanoff, 84 Ind. App.
676, 151 N.E. 26 (1925). No change of venue may be taken, but a change of judge is
proper. State ex rel. Beckham v. Vandeburgh Circuit Court, supra; State ex rel. Hobbs
v. Claycombe, supra; State ex rel. Krodel v. Gilkinson, 209 Ind. 213, 198 N.E. 323
(1935).
45. Lake v. Jones, 49 Ind. 297 (1874) ; Roy v. Scales, 77 Ind. App. 619, 133 N.E.
924 (1921). Affidavits not referred to in the complaint and which do not refer to the
complaint or show by whom the affidavit was filed, will not be considered part of the
complaint and therefore fail to meet this requirement. Parker v. Indianapolis Nat'l
Bank, 1 Ind. App. 462, 27 N.E. 650 (1890). Alleging that one is not a member of a
firm that was sued on a promissory note is a meritorious defense. Bristor v. Galvin,
62 Ind. 352 (1878). But merely alleging that the applicant has a meritorious defense
and that, if the judgment is set aside, he would appear at the trial and prove that the
judgment plaintiff had not been damaged as was alleged, does not meet the requirement
of alleging a meritorious defense. Roy v. Scales, supra.
46. Bristor v. Galvin, supra note 45. Haas v. Schrum, 72 Ind. App. 381, 124 N.E.
761 (1919). The admission of counter-affidavits on the issue of a meritorious defense
would place the merits of the case in issue. This would result in a trial on the merits
before the court has determined whether one is warranted. Lake v. Jones, 49 Ind. 297
(1874).
47. Globe Mining Co. v. Oak Ridge Coal Co., 204 Ind. 11, 177 N.E. 868 (1932).
48. Lake v. Jones, 49 Ind. 297 (1874).
49. Carty v. Toro, 223 Ind. 1, 57 N.E.2d 434 (1944).
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relief should be resolved in favor of the applicant since the statute is
remedial in nature and its terms should be liberally construed. "
In addition to the fixed time requisite, diligence is also required. An
applicant must act with due diligence in asserting a timely request for
relief. " While the diligence requirement might also be imposed on an
applicant to assure seasonable discovery of the excusable neglect, no cases
have been discovered confirming this point. "2 Reasonable diligence is a
question of fact to be determined by the court" and smacks of the doctrine of laches. The courts have also imposed another requirement of
diligence on the applicant; he must act diligently in seeking to prevent
rendition of the original judgment.54 Diligence, used in this sense, is not
a time limit but a component of the type of conduct required by the court
before the neglect is considered excusable. The words excusable neglect,
surprise, mistake, or inadvertence connote a degree of negligence, while
reasonable diligence implies that the applicant acted without fault. The
interposition of the requirement of diligence in this respect seems to
represent not a fixed rule but an attitude of the courts. This requirement cannot be literally construed in light of the decided cases.5" It is
submitted that it is merely a reminder that, while the statute authorizing
vacation of judgments taken through excusable neglect is a remedial one,
the interest of finality is to be highly regarded and not readily subverted.
A decision vacating a judgment is not a final judgment from which
an appeal will lie." Nor can such a holding be assigned as error on a
motion for new trial following the hearing on the merits, unless it is
shown that the alleged error resulted in prejudice to the former judgment
holder at the subsequent trial on the merits." But a decision refusing to
50. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n v. Doherty, 70 Ind. App. 214, 123 N.E. 242
(1918); Neat v. Topp, 49 Ind. App. 512, 97 N.E. 578 (1912).
51. Ammerman v. State ex rel. Wasson, 98 Ind. 165 (1884) ; Birch v. Frantz, 77
Ind. 199 (1881) ; Dausman v. Dausman, 110 Ind. App. 238, 33 N.E.2d 775 (1941).
52. In many situations this phase would be non-existent, as in the case where a
non-default judgment is taken through excusable neglect, etc., or where execution is
levied on a default judgment immediately. But it is submitted that a judgment could
go undiscovered for months, and if the losing party, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have earlier discovered the existence of the judgment, it is doubtful that
the court would grant relief.
53. First Nat'l Bank v. Stillwell, 50 Ind. App. 227, 98 N.E. 151 (1912).
54. Moore v. Homer, 146 Ind. 287, 45 N.E. 341 (1896) ; Delewski v. Delewski, 76
Ind. App. 44, 131 N.E. 229 (1921) ; Houser v. Laughlin, 55 Ind. App. 563, 104 N.E. 309

(1913).
55. See notes 6 through 28 supra and accompanying text.
56. Woddard v. Killen, 196 Ind. 570, 148 N.E. 195 (1925) ; Staggs v. Wright, 118
Ind. App. 247, 76 N.E.2d 588 (1948) ; Heck v. Wayman, 94 Ind. App. 74, 179 N.E. 785
(1932). It is questionable whether a judgment holder should be required to bear the
expense, delay and inconvenience of a new trial if the new trial was erroneously granted.
57. Oil Express, Inc. v. Mid-States Freight Lines, Inc., 124 Ind. App. 243, 116

N.E.2d 531 (1954).
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set the judgment aside is a final judgment from which an appeal lies."
The appellate court will uphold the findings of the trial court unless there
is an abuse of discretion. 9 The appellate court is indeed reluctant to
find abuse of discretion, and leaves a wide area open to the trial court in
which it is free to decide either way." Therefore, except in the most
clear abuse of discretion, appeal is futile. The appellate court is more
reluctant to interfere when the judgment has been set aside and the cause
heard on the merits than when the former judgment is not disturbed."
Federal Rule 60 (b) (1) is the comparable section under the Federal
Rules. 2 Neither the Federal Rules nor the Indiana statute is restricted
to default judgments.6
Both have essentially the same requirements of
alleging a meritorious defense64 and introducing facts amounting to excusable neglect, etc. 5 The Indiana statute expressly provides that the
judgment must be "taken against him" before relief can be granted, so in
absence of any precedent it must be concluded that Burns 2-1068 is not
available to prevailing parties.6 This phrase was deleted from Rule
60(b) (1) by a 1946 amendment to provide for situations where the
prevailing party was not accorded adequate relief.6" In this respect, the
Federal Rule is superior to the Indiana rule. Another distinction is in
the inclusion of the word "his" in the Indiana statute" and its absence
from Rule 60 (b) (1)." A literal application of the Indiana statute would
limit relief to cases where the mistake, excusable neglect, surprise, or inadvertence was that of the litigant. But the cases have generally ignored
this restriction or have given it a broad construction."0
Federal Rule 60(b) (1) must be invoked within one year from the
58. Heck v. Wayman, 94 Ind. App. 74, 179 N.E. 785 (1932).
59. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Poetker, 180 Ind. 255, 102 N.E.
372 (1913); Delewski v. Delewski, 76 Ind. App. 44, 131 N.E. 229 (1921); Masten v.
Indiana Car and Foundry Co., 25 Ind. App. 175, 57 N.E. 148 (1900).
60. See Hoag v. Jeff ers, 201 Ind. 249, 159 N.E. 753 (1929) ; Neat v. Topp. 49 Ind.
App. 512, 97 N.E. 578 (1911) ; Comstock v. Whitworth, 75 Ind. 129 (1881) ; Ayrshire
Coal Co. v. Thurman, 73 Ind. App. 578, 127 N.E. 810 (1920).
61. Winer v. Mast, 146 Ind. 77, 45 N.E. 66 (1896) ; Neat v. Topp, supra note 60.
62. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.22 (2d ed. 1955).

63. Fleming v. Huebsch Laundry Corp., 159 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1947). See note 2
supra and accompanying text.
64. Fernow v. Gubser, 136 F.2d 971 (10th Cr. 1943) ; Sebastiano v. United States,
103 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Bowles v. Branick, 66 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Mo.

1946). See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
65. Bowles v. Branick, 66 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1946). See note 43 supra and
accompanying text.
66. See note 1 supra. But see IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2406 (Burns 1946).
67. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 60.22 [1] (2d ed. 1955).
68. See note 1 supra.
69.

7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.22 [1] (2d ed. 1955).

70.

See notes 13 through 18 supra and accompanying text.
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date of judgment,7 while Burns 2-1068 allows proceedings within two
years.7
Both are subject to the additional requirement that an action
must be brought within reasonable time after discovery of the mistake,"
both allow appeal from a judgment refusing to set aside the original
judgment74 and deny appeal when the judgment is vacated." Both permit reversal on matters of fact only where there has been abuse of discretion."0 Procedural formalities are similar under the two remedies and,
except as to .prevailing parties, the substantive relief is identical. Allowances must be made for factual interpretation, and differences will
arise in a few situations, but for the most part the two jurisdictions
reach similar results. Because the two remedies are so similar, it must
be concluded that the Indiana statute, in permitting application for relief
for twice the time allowed under Federal Rule 60(b) (1), places greater
emphasis on the interest in correcting erroneous judgments.
The rules governing the applicability of Burns 2-1068 are aimed at
granting relief liberally. 7 The statute is clearly intended to preserve
finality while eliminating the hardships of unfair judgments. The nature
of the remedy requires that its effectiveness depend to a great extent
upon the discretion of the trial court. No rule requiring liberal construction of the statute" or requiring doubt to be resolved in favor of a trial
on the merits79 can itself determine what is excusable neglect, etc. These
rules are an aid, but the ultimate decision must necessarily lie with the
trial judge. This feature of the remedy naturally causes occasional undesirable results and inconsistencies. Here the fault is not in the statute
but in the attitude of the trial courts. Some Indiana courts demand that
an applicant must exercise due diligence in seeking to prevent rendition
of the original judgment. While not condoning vacation of judgments
where the applicant acted with gross carelessness, it is submitted that
some Indiana courts have so strictly applied this aspect of diligence that,
had it been complied with, there would have been no necessity for an
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
72. See note 1 supra.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
74. Cromelin v. Markwalter, 181 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1950). See note 58 supra and
accompanying text.
75. United States v. Agne, 161 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1947). See note 56 supra and
accompanying text.
76. Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 175 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1949).
See.note 59 supra and accompanying text.
77. Neat v. Topp, 49 Ind. App. 512, 97 N.E. 578 (1912) ; Ziegler v. Funkhouser, 42
Ind. App. 428, 85 N.E. 984 (1908).
78. See note 50 supra.

79. Ibid.
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action to vacate.8" Some courts have thus corrupted a fair and workable
rule by imposing a gloss on the statute.
Relief Where Defendant Had No Notice Other Than By Publication'
By statute Indiana provides that a defendant to an action in which
notice was given by publication only may, within five years,8' have a
default judgment opened as a matter of right. If the applicant complies
with the 'statutory provisions, he leaves the court with no discretion and
the judgment must be vacated.82 If the proceedings are instituted after
the expiration of the term in which the judgment was rendered, the
action is an independent proceeding.83 The applicant must give notice
to the original parties or their successors and file a full answer to the
original complaint with an affidavit stating that no actual notice was
received in time to allow appearance in court.8 4 The complaint must
show that the original plaintiff received actual notice of the present action
within five years of the original judgment. 5 The proceedings must be
instituted in the same court in which the original judgment was rendered. 0 This means of opening judgment unlike others, does not require
the defendant to show that the original judgment was erroneous."r Legal
disabilities do not extend the time allotted for re-opening the judgment
80. Houser v. Laughlin, 55 Ind. App. 563, 104 N.E. 309 (1913). See notes 15 and
28 supra and accompanying text.
81. "Parties against whom a judgment has been' rendered without other notice than
the publication in a newspaper as herein required, except in cases of divorce, may, at any
time within five [5] years after the rendition of the judgment, have the same opened,
and be allowed to defend." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2601 (Burns 1946). See IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-2602 and 2-2603 (1946). The statute is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed. Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., 108 Ind. App. 401, 27 N.E.2d 917
(1940).
82. Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., supra note 81.
83. Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., 108 Ind. App. 401, 405, 23 N.E.2d 917, 919
(1940).
84. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2602 (Burns 1946). This section requires an affidavit
stating that during the pendency of the action the applicant received no actual notice in
time to appear in court and object to the action. However, the required affidavit need
not be sworn to by the applicant. Anyone who submits such an affidavit fulfills the
requirement. Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., supra note 81. The applicant is required to file a "full answer to the original complaint" before the judgment will be vacated. The rationale of this requisite is the prevention of further delay. However, an
answer filed at the time of vacation of the judgment meets this requirement. Bryant v.
Richardson, 126 Ind. 145, 75 N.E. 807 (1890). While the court appears to have violated
the literal meaning of the statute, it allowed the cause to be heard on the merits and still
complied with the policy of preventing further delay.
85. Young v. Foster, 58 Ind. App. 253, 104 N.E. 769 (1915). This unusual method
of computing time is occasioned by a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, even the original
plaintiff's appearance after five years would not waive the notice requirements because
the court loses jurisdiction under the statute after five years if all statutory requirements have not been complied with.
86. Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., 108 Ind. App. 401, 27 N.E.2d 917 (1940).
87. Id. at 405, 27 N.E.2d at 919.
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under this section."8 If relief is unavailable under this section because a
legal disability has extended the time beyond five years, the proper
remedy is Burns 2-1068."9
Federal Rule 60(b) contains no comparable provision. A possible
explanation for its absence is that there is no general authorization of
notice by publication under the Federal Rules."0 Notice by publication
is available under certain specified actions, 9 and in comparing these to
the Indiana rule, it is clear that the Indiana statute places greater emphasis on the interest in correcting erroneous judgments.
Complaint For New Trial
In the complaint for new trial, Indiana offers additional statutory
machinery for opening judgments.9 2 To be successful, this must:
(1) show that it was filed within a year from the date of the judgment;3 (2) allege that the complaint was filed not later than the second
term after discovery of the cause for new trialf4 (3) state facts which
show the causes for new trial could not have been discovered by the use
of due diligence in time to file a motion for new trial;95 (4) set out the
issues and the evidence given in the former trial;98 and (5) state what
the newly discovered evidence is and show its materiality."
88. Hollenback v. Poston, 34 Ind. App. 481, 73 N.E. 162 (1904).
89. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
90. But FED. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (7) may provide for such service in that it legalizes
any method of service of summons in force in the state in which the service is made.
91. 62 STAT. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1952). Judgment may be re-opened
within one year.
92. "Where causes for a new trial are discovered after the term at which the
verdict or decision was rendered, the application may be made by a complaint filed with
the clerk, not later than the second term after the discovery, on which a summons shall
issue, as on other complaints, requiring the adverse party to appear and answer. The
application shall stand for hearing at the term to which the summons is returned executed, and shall be summarily decided by the court upon the evidence produced by the
parties. But no such application shall be made more than one [1] year after the final
judgment was rendered." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2405 (Burns 1946).
Divorce decrees may not be attacked under this section. Powell v. Powell, 104 Ind.
18, 3 N.E. 639 (1885). Divorce decrees entered when notice is given by publications are
dealt with by a separate statute. The time limit for re-opening divorce decrees is two
years. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1224 (Burns 1946). Partition proceedings are also dealt
with by separate statute. Here the time limit is one year. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2425
(Burns 1946). The brief time limit is probably based on a consideration of marketability and security of land titles.
93. Hiatt v. Ballinger, 59 Ind. 303 (1877) ; McKernan v. Estabrook, 66 Ind. App.
212, 115 N.E. 956 (1917).
94. McKernan v. Estabrook, supra note 93.
95. McKernan v. Estabrook, supra note 93; Anderson v. Hathaway, 130 Ind. 528,
30 N.E. 638 (1891).
96. Hines v.Driver, 100 Ind. 315 (1885); Carver v.Compton, 51 Ind. 451 (1875).
97. Anderson v.Hathaway, 130 Ind. 528, 30 N.E.638 (1891) ; Hines v.Driver, 100
I-d. 315 (1885). Where the complaint is initiated by more than one party, all material
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Complaint for new trial is a new and independent action 8 which lies
for the same causes that would warrant granting a motion for new trial9
and is tried summarily without a jury.' 0 It may not be initiated within
the thirty day period allowed for the filing of a motion for a new trial.'
The complaint must be filed in the court that rendered the original judgAll parties to
ment 0 2 and, when possible, heard by the same judge.'
the original action must be made parties to the subsequent complaint for
new trial.'
The chief and perhaps only causes for granting relief on a complaint
for new trial are newly discovered evidence and misconduct of the jury
or prevailing party.0 9 Where the judgment is taken by default, complaint for new trial is an improper remedy.' 0 The applicant should introduce in evidence the testimony heard at the former trial. 0 7 It is not
necessary that the court find an absolute defense; it is sufficient if the
newly discovered evidence be of such nature that it will probably produce a different result if a new trial is granted.0 8 The newly discovered
evidence must not be merely cumulative nor impeaching in nature.' 9
After the complaint has been found sufficient, the evidence may be heard
by parol." 0 Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party includes fraud
allegations must be shown as to both parties or the entire complaint is insufficient.
Bertram v. State ex rel. Lowell Dredge Co., 32 Ind. App. 199, 69 N.E. 479 (1903).
98. Jones v. Kolman, 50 Ind. App. 158, 98 N.E. 74 (1911). IND. ANN. STAT. §
2-2405 (Burns 1946).
99. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2405 (Burns 1946).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2405 (Burns
100. Houston v. Bruner, 59 Ind. 25 (1877).
1946).
101. McKernan v. Estabrook, 66 Ind. App. 212, 115 N.E. 956 (1917); Fisher v.
Southern Ry. Co., 55 Ind. App. 599, 104 N.E. 521 (1914).
102. Lowry v. Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co., 77 Ind. App. 135, 120 N.E.
223 (1921).
103. Burton v. Harris, 76 Ind. 429 (1881). The judge who heard the original
cause is more qualified to evaluate the validity of the cause for new trial because of
his familiarity with the prior proceedings.
104. Carver v. Compton, 51 Ind. 451 (1875) ; East v. McKee, 14 Ind. App. 45, 42
N.E. 368 (1895).
105. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2401 (Burns 1946). The other causes listed for
which a motion for new trial will be granted, by their nature, would not be grounds for
relief on a complaint for new trial because, if not pursued on a motion for new trial,
the diligence requirement could not he fulfilled.
106. Burton v. Harris, 76 Ind. 429 (1881). Applicant cannot be accorded new trial
because there never has been a trial.
The applicant
107.
Meldon v. Cox, 60 Ind. App. 403, 110 N.E. 1008 (1916).
should introduce in evidence the record of the former trial, show what the evidence was,
prove the newly discovered evidence, and show how it will probably change the result.
Meldon v. Cox, supra.
108. Hines v. Driver, 100 Ind. 315 (1885) ; Eastern Rock Island Plow Co. v. Stout
84 Ind. App. 217, 147 N.E. 160 (1925) ; Meldon v. Cox, supra note 107. See Lowry v.
Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co., 77 Ind. App. 138, 120 N.E. 223 (1921).
109. Marshall v. Mathers, 103 Ind. 458, 3 N.E. 120 (1885) ; Hines v. Driver, 100
Ind. 315 (1885).
110. Allen v. Gillum, 16 Ind. 234 (1861).
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in procurement of the judgment, but intrinsic fraud such as perjury is
not grounds for relief under complaint for new trial.11'
The judgment rendered on a complaint for new trial is a final appealable judgment," 2 but motion for new trial is required before an appeal may be taken."' The decision to grant a new trial under this proceeding is largely up to the discretion of the trial court and it will not be
reversed on appeal except for abuse of discretion." 4 This remedy is not
barred when an appeal was taken from the original judgment and may
be instituted even while such appeal is pending."5 An applicant refused
relief during the pendency of the original appeal may appeal the decision
on the complaint for new trial and the two will be consolidated."' If a
new trial is granted while the appeal from the original judgment is pending, the appeal becomes moot and will be dismissed."'
The complaint for new trial for newly discovered evidence, like review of judgment for material new matter,"' is comparable to Federal
Rule 60(b) (2)."' The evidentiary requirement of Rule 60(b) (2)
seems almost identical to that of the complaint for new trial. The time
limit is the same 20 and both have similar requirements as to diligence' 2'
and the categories of evidence that are admissible.'22 The terminology
111. Brassard v. Stoner, 83 Ind. App. 655, 149 N.E. 646 (1925) ; Pepin v. Lautman,
28 Ind. App. 74, 62 N.E. 60 (1901). Contra, Vivian Collieries Co. v. Cahall, 184 Ind.
473, 481, 110 N.E. 672, 675 (1915) (dictum).
112. Lowry v. Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co., 77 Ind. App. 138, 126
N.E. 223 (1921); Jones v. Kolman, 50 Ind. App. 158, 98 N.E. 74 (1911). This is the
rule regardless of whether an appeal was taken from the original judgment.
113. Starke County Trust and Say. Bank v. Hobart, 89 Ind. App. 637, 167 N.E. 720
(1929).
114. Eastern Rock Island Plow Co. v. Stout, 84 Ind. App. 217, 147 N.E. 160
(1925). A decision refusing relief does not bar another proceeding if a new cause for
new trial would arise. However, the new evidence must be more compelling than that
required on the prior complaint for new trial.
115. Louisville and N. R.R. Co. v. Vinyard, 39 Ind. App. 628, 79 N.E. 384 (1906).
This raises an interesting question on how the appellate court and the trial court
can act on the same judgment at the same time. Admittedly, the two procedures are
separate and distinct, but the judgment under attack is the same one. It would seem
that the appellate court's interest should pre-empt action by the trial court and in absence of permission of the appellate court, the trial court should not entertain a complaint for new trial. Perhaps the answer is one of practicality. No one is harmed or
prejudiced by the present rule and it eliminates a formality which is of no real usefulness.
116. Oldfather v. Zent, 11 Ind. App. 430, 39 N.F_ 221 (1894).
117. Thalman v. Montgomery Ward, 120 Ind. App. 532, 94 N.E.2d 370 (1950).
118. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2605 (Burns 1946). See note 134 infra and accompanying text.
119. See 7 Mooan, FEDERAL PaAcnicE § 60.23 (2d ed. 1955).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2405 (Burns 1946).
121. Greenspahn v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, 186 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1951).
See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
122. Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 172 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1949). See note 109
supra and accompanying text.
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of Rule 60(b)(2) is the same as that of a complaint for new trial for
newly discovered evidence and the standards are stated in almost identical
terms. 2 Therefore, both remedies provide substantially the same amount
of relief.
Federal Rule 60(b) (3) provides for relief for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,'24 but misconduct of
jurors apparently is not included.' 25 However, relief on the grounds of
12
jury misconduct is as a practical matter severely limited in Indiana. 1
Both rules have a time limit of one year.' 2 ' Federal Rule 60(b) (3)
makes no restriction based on the intrinsic-extrinsic fraud dichotomy, in
contrast to complaint for new trial. 128

Abrogation of the arbitrary in-

trinsic fraud rule gives the Federal Rule a much broader basis of substantive relief than that granted under the complaint for new trial.
In respect to newly discovered evidence and misconduct of the jury
or prevailing party, the complaint for new trial is as broad as the statute
authorizing motion for new trial. Therefore, its practical effect is to
extend the time for motion for new trial for these causes from thirty
days to one year. As to newly discovered evidence, such an extension
seems unnecessary in view of the remedy for review of judgments for
material new matter. 2 ' Because the standard imposed is theoretically
the same as that used on a motion for new trial for newly discovered
evidence, the complaint for new trial for newly discovered evidence
threatens the conventional concept of finality. The area of discretion of
the trial court is broad and its decision will not be disturbed unless there
is an abuse of this discretion. 3 This factor may allow the court to re123. Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra note 122. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
124. See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.24 (2d ed. 1955).
125. See 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.22[31 (2d ed. 1955). Moore contends
that because of the express language of Rule 60(b) (3), "of an adverse party," that this
section is not applicable where the fraud is perpetrated solely by a third person. However, he contends that relief would be granted either by Rule 60(b) (6), fraud on the
court, or an independent equitable proceeding. Thus, relief in this situation is adequately
provided for.
126. One practical difficulty in the problem of misconduct of a juror is that the
evidence must be submitted by one other than a juror. Evidence based on information
or belief is not admissible. The required affidavit must disclose the source of the affiant's information and show that it did not come directly or indirectly from a juror.
Pittsburgh C., C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Collins, 168 Ind. 467, 80 N.E. 415 (1906). There
would be relatively few situations where a complainant could obtain the necessary evidence that would entitle him to a new trial. No cases are available on this point under
a complaint for new trial. However, from the language of the statute it appears that
this type of rule on a motion for new trial would be equally applicable to a complaint
for new trial.

127.
129.

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2405
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3).. See note 111 supra.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604, 2-2605 (Burns 1946).

130.

Eastern Rock Island Plow Co. v. Stout, 84 Ind. App. 217, 147 N.E. 160 (1925).

128.

(Burns 1946).
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quire slightly stronger evidence than that required on motion for new
trial. A blameless judgment holder should not be forced to relinquish
rights in a judgment upon which he has relied for almost a year. After
such a period a new trial places many hardships upon the judgment
holder in gathering evidence and recalling witnesses. Though other
remedies providing for vacation of judgment may impose equal hardship, it must be remembered that, with the exception of review of judgment for material new matter, the other remedies provide relief because
of an error or a wrongful act of another party.'
On a complaint for
new trial for newly discovered evidence no one has erred or committed
a wrongful act. Therefore, the reasons for vacating the judgment are
more compelling under the other remedies than under complaint for new
trial for newly discovered evidence. As to review of judgment for material new matter,132 the evidence must be stronger than that required on
complaint for new trial for newly discovered evidence. Thus, the hardship placed on the judgment holder appears more justifiable in the case
of review for material new matter. It is argued that if the judgment is
unjust, the prevailing party ought not be heard to complain, because his
sole property right in the judgment is derived from the court; that the
judgment is recognized by the court only because the claim is believed
righteous and if it subsequently appears unjust the court should be allowed to vacate the judgment. This argument, while upholding justice,
completely ignores finality. Because review of judgment for new matter
requires a stronger showing of new evidence, it is submitted that review
of judgments best serves the principle of finality in requiring that a
stronger case be made as the period of attack becomes more belated.
However, if the remedy of complaint for new trial is to be retained, it is
submitted that courts, through their broad discretionary powers, should
impose a stricter standard as the time period between judgment and attack becomes greater. The greater the period of time that has transpired, the stronger case the complainant should be required to make.
There are situations where the injustice would be great enough to warrant setting the judgment aside, but in others the hardship imposed on
the prevailing party and on third persons may outweigh the interest in
vacating the judgment; even where the complaint sets out grounds which,
if raised sooner, would have justified granting a new trial. The court,
balancing the interests of finality and rights of the judgment holder and
third parties on one side against the interests in correcting erroneous
judgments and rights of the complainant on the other, could probably
131. IND.
132. IND.

ANN. STAT.
ANN. STAT.

§ 2-1068, 2-2604 (Burns 1946).
§ 2-2605 (Burns 1946).
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achieve a more equitable result by exercising sound discretion than by
any rigid rule. The flexibility of this method would allow the court to
tailor relief to the ramifications of the specific situation. It is not contended that the discretion of the trial court be unrestricted, but only that
standards be pliable enough to allow the court to weigh the relevant factors in making a decision. The requirement of diligence in discovering
the evidence in the complaint for new trial may tend to accomplish this
purpose within the one year period. 3
Review of Judgment..
Indiana provides by statute that relief under review of judgment is
133. See note 95 supra. Gavit questions the validity of the complaint for a new
trial in light of the thirty day period allowed for filing a motion for new trial. Conceding its utility, he contends that the statute authorizing a complaint for new trial be
repealed and the statute authorizing a motion for new trial be amended to permit the
filing of a motion on grounds of newly discovered evidence (and misconduct of the jury
or prevailing party?) within a reasonable time. Thus, the "cumbersome procedure of a
new action" would be repudiated. 2 GAvir, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 471
(1942). "Any person who is a party to any judgment, or the heirs, devisees or personal
representatives of a deceased party, may file in the court where such judgment is rendered a complaint for a review of the proceedings and judgment. Any person under
legal disabilities may file such complaint at any time within one [1] year after the
disability is removed. But no complaint shall be filed for a review of a judgment of
divorce." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946).
The prescribed time limits are equally applicable to non-residents. Rosa v. Prather,
103 Ind. 191, 2 N.E. 575 (1885). Because the statute sets out its own time limits, the
statute of limitations is not applicable. Rosa v. Prather, supra. However, the defendant
in the proceedings to review may defend on the grounds that the statute of limitations
has run on the original cause of action. Kiley v. Murphy, 7 Ind. App. 238, 34 N.E. 112
(1893).
"The complaint may be filed for any error of law appearing in the proceedings and
judgment, within one [1] year; or for material new matter, discovered since the rendition thereof, within three [3] years; or for both causes, within one [1] year after the
rendition of the judgment, and without leave of the court." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2605
(Burns 1946).
"When the complaint for a review is filed for new matter discovered since the rendition of the judgment, it shall be verified by the complainant, and show that the new
matter could not have been discovered before judgment by reasonable diligence, and that
the complaint is filed without delay after the discovery." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2606
(Burns 1946).
"At any time after filing the complaint, and before the final hearing, the court may,
upon application of the plaintiff, stay all further proceedings on the judgment. When
proceedings are stayed, the court shall direct bond and surety to be given, as in cases
of appeal." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2607 (Burns 1946).
"The defendant shall be notified of the filing of such complaint, and the parties
shall proceed to form issues of law and fact as in other cases." IND. ANN. STAT. §
2-2608 (Burns 1946).
"Upon the hearing, the court may reverse or affirm the judgment, in whole or in
part, or modify the same, as the justice of the case may require, and award costs according to the rule prescribed for the awarding of costs in the Supreme Court on

appeal."

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 2-2609 (Burns 1946).

134. It is to be noted that the statutes governing review of judgments are extremely
comprehensive, leaving a minimum to the construction of the courts.
The complaint for review of judgment evolved from the equitable remedy of bill of
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available for two causes: (1) errors of law appearing in the proceedings
and judgment, if the complaint is filed within one year from the date of
judgment; 3 or (2) material new matter discovered since rendition of
the judgment, if the complaint is filed within three years from the date
of judgment."' All final judgments, except divorce decrees,"' ex parte
proceedings,"' and matters connected with a decendent's estate,3 9 may
be reviewed under these sections. 4 ' Decrees of partition may be reviewed under certain circumstances.' 4' Default judgments are subject
to review, 42 as are void judgments. 4

The complaint is an independent proceeding and must be brought
in the same court that rendered the original judgment.'
It is a direct
attack 4' from which no change of venue may be taken.' 46 The proceeding may be brought by a party to the original suit or by his heirs, devises,
or personal representatives;... a grantee of property affected by the
judgment is also entitled to review if his grantor would have had the
right. 4 ' All parties to the original suit must be made parties to the
review, initiated by the Ordinances of Chancellor Bacon. Ross v. Banta, 140 Ind. 120,
136, 34 N.E. 865, 869 (1895) ; Nealis v. Dicks, 72 Ind. 374 (1880).
135. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2605 (Burns 1946).
136. Ibid.
137. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946). Willman v. Willman, 57 Ind. 500
(1877). See INn. ANN. STAT. § 44-110 (Burns 1946).
138. Guy v. Pierson, 21 Ind. 18 (1863); Williams v. Williams 18 Ind. 345 (1862);
Davidson v. Lindsay, 16 Ind. 186 (1861).
139. McCurdy v. Love, 97 Ind. 62 (1884). Contra, Funk v. Davis, 103 Ind. 281,
2 N.E. 739 (1885) (review allowed for improper correction of a will).
140. First Nat'l Bank v. Hanna, 12 Ind. App. 240, 39 N.E. 1054 (1895).
No review for error of law is allowed from a judgment taken by agreement of the
parties. The errors of the prior proceeding are waived. Collins v. Rose, 59 Ind. 33
(1877). But there is no apparent reason to waive any right to review for material
new matter. A waiver of one's rights to pursue review for material new matter would
encourage litigation and deter settlement.
141. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2425 (Burns 1946).
142. Michener v. Springfield Engine and Thresher Co., 142 Ind. 130, 40 N.E. 679
(1895); Ervin School Township v. Tapp, 121 Ind. 463, 23 N.E. 505 (1889); Montgomery v. Hamilton, 43 Ind. 451 (1873).
143. Shafer v. Shafer, 181 Ind. 244, 104 N.E. 507 (1914); Bartmess v. Holiday,
27 Ind. App. 544, 61 N.E. 750 (1901). See Willman v. Willman, 57 Ind. 500 (1877),
where a divorce decree was vacated on the grounds that it was void; cf. note 138 supra.
144. INn. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946). Attica Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v.
Colvert, 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483 (1939).
145. Deputy v. Dollarhide, 42 Ind. App. 554, 86 N.E. 344 (1908).
146. Attica Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Colvert, 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483 (1939).
147. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946). Ross v. Banta, 140 Ind. 120, 136, 34
N.E. 865, 869-870 (1895).
148. Ross v. Banta, 140 Ind. 120, 135-137, 34 N.E. 865, 870 (1895). But see Egoff
v. Bd. of Children's Guardians, 170 Ind. 238, 244, 84 N.E. 151, 154 (1907). This case
holds an applicant who was not a party to the original suit may not bring a proceeding
to review the judgment. However, it is submitted that this result does not contravene
the result reached in Ross v. Banta, supra, because in the instant case the applicant did
not stand in an analogous position to the party in the former case. There the applicant
had purchased land which was later affected by a judgment from an heir of an original
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action to review.'49 The complaint to review is defective unless it sets
out a copy of the original judgment ;15 however, the complaint may be
amended.' 5' A judgment granting relief under these proceedings places
the parties in the same position they were in before the original suit.152
One under legal disability may file a complaint to review within one year
after the disability has been removed.'5 3 This rule has sometimes resulted in an unusual time lapse between judgment and attack.'
The complaint for review for errors of law must: (1) set out the
alleged erroneous rulings, (2) specifically point out the error, and
(3) show the facts upon which the ruling is based. 5 ' Review for error
party to the suit. In the latter case, the applicant could not be related to the original
litigants in any way.
149. Douglas v. Davis, 45 Ind. 493 (1874) ; Tereba v. Standard Cabinet Mfg. Co.,
32 Ind. App. 9, 68 N.E. 1033 (1903). If parties will not join as plaintiffs they may be
made defendants. Douglas v. Davis, sapra.
150. Bradford v. School Town of Madison, 107 Ind.'280, 7 N.E. 256 (1886).
151. Alexander v. Daugherty, 69 Ind. 388 (1879) ; Foster v. Potter, 24 Ind. 363

(1865).
152. Leech v. Perry, 77 Ind. 422 (1881) ; Maghee v. Collins, 27 Ind. 83 (1866). A
judgment may be vacated as to some parties and remain in force as to others. Wright
v. Churchman, 135 Ind. 683, 35 N.E. 835 (1893).
153. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns 1946). Attica Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v.
Colvert, 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483 (1939).
154. See, e.g., Attica Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Colvert, 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483
(1939) (setting aside a twelve year old judgment). The case also has the effect of
cutting off the rights of bona fide purchasers. On this point, see Comment, 15 IND. L.J.
437 (1940).
Because of this rule, the statutes dealing with review of judgments have been
strongly attacked. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF INDIANA, RECOAfMFENDATIONS TO THE SUPREME
COURT, pt. III, at 59-77 (1940). The report points out that the rule results in instability
of land titles and heavily burdens the concept of finality. It proposes that the statutes
be amended, contending that the remedies of equitable relief and vacation for mistake,
surprise, excusable neglect, or inadvertence are usually adequate and allowing an extension of time because of a disability only for fraud. The proposed change would not
permit an applicant to initiate a review of judgment after a disability has extended the
time beyond the express statutory limits except when the judgment had been procured
by fraud. It is submitted that these remedies do not ordinarily grant relief for errors
of law or material new matter. The statutes dealing with review of judgment furnish a
remedy of an entirely different nature than the remedies of equitable relief and relief
for excusable neglect, etc. There is merit in the suggestion that judgments should not
be subject to uncertainty for what could be a considerable length of time, but the interest of according justice to a litigant who is under a disability cannot be totally ignored. The disabled party who is represented by a guardian ad litem may be adequately
protected, but what of the incapacitated litigant whom the court neglects to protect by
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem? Judgments taken against persons under a disability, and not represented by guardian, are not void, but are only erroneous and may
not be collaterally attacked. Judd v. Gray, 156 Ind. 278, 286, 59 N.E. 849, 851 (1901).
Therefore, if the rule allowing suit by one under a disability after the disability has
been removed were completely abrogated, there would be many cases where such a person would be without remedy. It is submitted that it is not necessary to repeal the laws
on review of judgment to cure the fault objected to; a revision providing that bona fide
purchasers would not be affected by the proceedings would afford an adequate remedy.
155. Hague v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ind. 636, 65 N.E. 907 (1903) ; Michener v.
Springfield Engine and Thresher Co., 142 Ind. 130, 40 N.E. 679 (1895). The complaint
must set out a complete record of the original cause, or at least that much that is neces-

NOTES
of law lies only for those errors which occurred prior to, or in conjunction with, the judgment and only if proper objection was made at the
original trial. 6 A complaint to review for error of law and appeal are
alternative remedies and the utilization of one waives the right to pursue
the other."' Because review for error of law is a substitute for appeal,
it can only be asserted where an appeal might be taken and it must be
tried solely by the record.' 58 The original trial court sits as an appellate
court. Substantial error will justify reversal; great injustice is not
necessary, and any errors of law committed will be presumed prejudicial
unless the contrary is shown."5 9
The complaint to review for material new matter must contain three
elements: (1) it must allege that the new matter was not known when
the judgment was rendered;.6 (2) it must show facts which prove that
the new matter could not have been discovered by the use of reasonable
diligence before rendition of the judgment;... and (3) it must show that
proceedings to review were instituted without undue delay after the discovery of the new matter. "2 The complaint must be verified, but affidavits of witnesses as to the new matter need not be included. 6 ' The
sary to fully present the errors complained of. Whitehall v. Crawford, 67 Ind. 84
(1879). However, in Wabash R.R. Co. v. Young, 154 Ind. 24, 55 N.E. 853 (1900), it
was held that the complaint is sufficient if it sets out so much of the record that
would be necessary on appeal, and that irrelevant parts should be omitted. A transcript
may be attached to the complaint as an exhibit, but the complaint must still contain
enough of the pleadings in its body to present the error without resorting to the transcript. Michener v. Springfield Engine and Thresher Co., 142 Ind. 130, 40 N.E. 679
(1895).
156. Ferguson v. Hull, 136 Ind. 339, 36 N.E. 254 (1894).
157. Calumet Teaming and Trucking Co. v. Young, 218 Ind. 468, 33 N.E.2d 109
(1941) ; Talge Montgomery Co. v. Astoria Mahogany Co., 195 Ind. 433, 141 N.E. 50
(1924).
158. See Calumet Teaming and Trucking Co. v. Young, .supra note 157.
The complaint must show that proper exceptions were made in the original proceedings. Wohaldo v. Fary, 221 Ind. 219, 46 N.E.2d 489 (1943) ; Calumet Teaming and
Trucking Co. v. Young, supra. But this rule is not applicable when failure to except
does not waive the error. Calumet Teaming and Trucking Co. v. Young, supra; Lambert v. Smith 216 Ind. 226, 23 N.E.2d 430 (1939). E.g., where the court has no jurisdiction.
159. Calumet Teaming and Trucking Co. v. Young supra note 157. The error of
law must be such that would result in reversal on appeal. Hancher v. Stephenson, 147
Ind. 498, 46 N.E. 916 (1897).
160. Alexander v. Daugherty, 69 Ind. 388 (1879) ; Whitehall v. Crawford, 67 Ind.
84 (1879).
161. Warne v. Irwin, 153 Ind. 20, 53 N.E. 926 (1889).
162. Tereba v. Standard Cabinet Mfg. Co., 32 Ind. App. 9, 68 N.E. 1033 (1903).
163. Hill v. Roach, 72 Ind. 57 (1880). Review for material new matter involves
no error committed at the original trial. It is similar to a coram nobis proceeding in
that only questions of fact are involved. Calumet Teaming and Trucking Co. 218 Ind.
468, 33 N.E.2d 109 (1941).
The defendant, in his answers, may deny the correctness of the new matter or assert
an affirmative defense such as payment, statute of limitations and other errors apparent
on the face of the record of the original cause which, if assigned as cross-error on
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words "material new matter" have a different connotation than "newly
discovered evidence" as used in a motion for new trial and complaint for
new trial. For example, in Yuknavic& v. Yuknavich,'64 the court said,
"The asserted 'new matter' consists merely of subsequently discovered
receipts, documents and other evidence of these facts. While it may
have supplied sufficient grounds for a new trial, upon proper and timely
motion, as newly discovered evidence, it is not material new matter as
contemplated by the statute authorizing review of judgments." Material
new matter is such evidence that would probably entitle the complainant
to have the judgment reversed or at least modified.165
Generally, an appeal may be taken from a determination of the trial
court in an action to review judgments if an appeal would have been
allowed from the original judgment. 6
Such appeal must be taken
to the same court that would have had jurisdiction of an appeal from the
original judgment." 7 Appeal from a determination made in the action
to review for error of law will not be allowed unless the complaint was
filed before the expiration of the period allowed for appeal from the
original judgment. 8
But in cases of review for material new matter
expiration of such period bars neither party from appealing the determinations in the proceedings to review. 6
appeal, would result in the original judgment being affirmed. Kiley v. Murphy, 7 Ind.
App. 239, 34 N.E. 112 (1893).
164. 115 Ind. App. 530, 534, 58 N.E.2d 447, 448 (1945). Material new matter must
be something more than newly discovered evidence. Jones v. Tipton, 142 Ind. 643, 42
N.E. 221 (1895) ; Trust and Say. Bank v. Brusnahan, 88 Ind. App. 257, 147 N.E. 168
(1928).
165. Ross v. Clore, 120 Ind. App. 145, 81 N.E.2d 290 (1950); Trust and Say.
Bank v. Brusnahan, 88 Ind. App. 257, 147 N.E. 168 (1928).
166. See Slebar v. Corydon, 80 Ind. 95 (1881) ; Brown v. Keyser, 53 Ind. 85 (1876).
Where relief is denied in a proceedings to review, the applicant is barred from filing another complaint to review. Coen v. Funk, 26 Ind. 289 (1866).
But it is submitted that this rule should be limited to review for the same cause (error of law or
material new matter). Certainly pursuit of relief under one cause should not preclude
the applicant from asserting the other. Thus, where an appeal has been prosecuted from
a proceeding to review for errors of law, a complaint to review for material new matter may be initiated regardless of whether the judgment has been affirmed. Ross v.
Clore, supra note 165.
167. Jones v. Tipton, 142 Ind. 643, 42 N.E. 221 (1895) ; Dallin v. Mclvor, 140 Ind.
386, 39 N.E. 461 (1895).
168. Rittenour v. Hess, 96 Ind. App. 161, 174 N.E. 714 (1931); Am. Creosoting
Co. v. Reddington, 83 Ind. App. 365, 146 N.E. 761 (1925).
An applicant cannot raise errors committed in the original proceedings on an appeal
from a judgment rendered in a trial to review for errors of law. Such an appeal is
limited to errors committed in the latter proceedings. Calumet Teaming and Trucking
Co. v. Young, 218 Ind. 468, 33 N.E.2d 109 (1941).
169. Ross v. Clore, 120 Ind. App. 145, 81 N.E.2d 290 (1950). The party successful
in the original cause can appeal in any case. There was no reason for him to appeal at
the original suit, therefore he is not bound by the rule governing applicants in proceedings for review for error of law. Calumet Teaming and Trucking Co. v. Young, 218
Ind. 468, 33 N.E.2d 109 (1941).

NOTES
Federal Rule 60(b) provides no relief similar to that granted by
It therefore appears conclusive
review of judgment for error of law.'
that in this respect Indiana is less restricted by the concept of finality.
The purpose of such a provision is to grant an opportunity to the trial
court to correct its own errors, but it is difficult to comprehend why the
trial court should be allotted such an extraordinary length of time in
which to make its corrections. If the length of time allowed for appeals
is equitable and fair, there appears little reason to extend it merely because the relief is sought on the trial rather than appellate level.
Remembering that review for error of law and appeal are mutually
exclusive remedies, it is clear that review is less satisfactory than appeal
when the latter is available. The trial judge presumably has deliberated
upon the question previously and has ruled against the complainant,
while the appellate court has had no previous experience with the case.
With these considerations in mind, it would seem that review for error
of law would be resorted to only when: (1) the complainant cannot
afford the expense involved in taking an appeal; (2) the judgment
rendered against the complainant is so small an appeal would not be
worth while; (3) the complainant feels that the error is so obvious that
he is willing to resubmit it to the trial court; or (4) when appeal is not
available because of the expiration of time. There is merit in the first
reason listed, since such review is better than no remedy at all when lack
of financial resources precludes the complainant from his remedy of
appeal. The second and third reasons are sound and the existence of
review for error of law can readily be justified on these grounds, although it is conceded that the third could be fraught with risk. The last
reason cannot be jutsified. It is clear that the use of review of judgment
for error of law results in extension of appeal time from ninety days to
one year-more than four times as long. The one penalty for the delay
is that the complainant must submit the question to the trial court rather
than the appellate court. In weighing the interests of finality of judgments and substantial justice, keeping in mind that this remedy seeks to
rectify erroneous rulings of the court and other errors of law committed
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). But this portion of the review of judgment statutes
may have a counterpart under Federal Rule 60(b) (1). See 7 MooaE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 60.22 [3] (2d ed. 1955). There is authority to the contrary. Gilmore v. Hinman, 191
F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But Moore contends that because such relief was available
by a bill of review, and because the word "his" (mistake, etc.) has been deleted from
this section, that errors of law should now afford a basis for relief under this section.
However, Moore limits his contention by stating that relief from errors of law should
be granted only if the motion is made before the time allowed for appeal from the
original cause has expired. Thus, even viewed in its most liberal light, it is seen that
the Indiana rule concerning errors of law is less restrictive in its concept of when
liti-0tion should finally cease.
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before or during the proceedings, it is submitted that the usual time
afforded for appeal is adequate for corrections which may be necessary
to meet the ends of justice. It is therefore suggested that the time limit
for review for error of law should be limited to conform with the period
regularly allotted for appeals. This solution preserves the trial court's
interest in correcting its own error, allows the justifiable policy grounds
to remain effective, and still supplies a solid buttress to the interest of
finality.
Review of judgment for material new matter is comparable to Federal Rule 60(b) (2) which grants relief for newly discovered evidence.
The standards set forth by the courts of the two jurisdictions differ
slightly. The material new matter in Indiana must be such that would
probably entitle the applicant to have the judgment reversed or at least
modified.' 7' Under 60(b) (2), the newly discovered evidence must be
of such a material and controlling nature that, had it been before the
court, it would probably have induced a different conclusion.' 72 Neither
will grant relief for evidence which is merely cumulative in nature.'7 3
Both have the same requirements as to diligence and pursuit of relief
within a reasonable time.7
Indiana has the more lenient rule in that it
allows relief within a three year period, while 60(b) (2) is limited by a
one year period.' 75 But, in view of the standards used, it would seem
that 60(b) (2) is more liberal than the Indiana rule respecting the requisites for substantive relief.
Equitable Relief
Courts of general jurisdiction have power to enjoin the enforcement
of judgments, to order judgments set aside to permit the filing of a motion for new trial, and to grant a new trial. 6 The court will grant such
relief whenever by fraud, accident, mistake or otherwise an unfair advantage has been taken and it is against good conscience to allow the prevailing party to use this advantage. 7 The action is in personam and
acts against the person holding the judgment, not against the court that
171. See note 68 supra.
172. Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 172 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1949).
173. See note 172 supra. See Yuknavich v. Yuknavicb, 115 Ind. App. 530, 58
N.E.2d 447 (1945).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See note 162 supra.
175.

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

176. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Lundquist, 222 Ind. 359, 53 N.E.2d 338 (1943);
Gilkison v. Darlington, 123 Ind. App. 28, 106 N.E.2d 473 (1952). Weiss v. Guerineau,
109 Ind. 438, 9 N.E. 399 (1886).
177. Himelstein Bros., Inc. v. Texas Co., 125 Ind. App. 448, 125 N.E.2d 820
(1955) ; Hitt v. Carr, 77 Ind. App. 488, 130 N.E. 1 (1921).

NOTES
rendered it or the judgment itself." 8 Because the injunction acts againit
the person, it would seem that a complaint for equitable relief could be
initiated in any court of general jurisdiction, but relief in Indiana must
be sought in the same court that rendered the judgment, if that court is
one of general jurisdiction. 9
Four general rules govern the applicability of equitable relief:
(1) complainant must show that the judgment could not have been prevented by exercise of due diligence;... (2) complainant must have been
reasonably diligent in discovering the fraud, surprise, or accident;"'1
(3) after discovery, relief must be diligently pursued;..2 and (4) complainant must show a meritorious defense that will probably produce a
different result at the new trial.'
Courts exercise their equitable powers with reluctance and will do so
only if there is no adequate legal remedy.'8 4 Equity will go no further
in granting relief than is necessary to correct the wrong.' 8 Thus the
enforcement of the judgment will not be enjoined where setting aside
the judgment and ordering a new trial provides an adequate remedy.
What comprises mistake, accident, fraud, or a situation where equity
178. 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1178 (5th ed. 1925).
179. Scott v. Runner, 125 Ind. 12, 44 N.E. 755 (1896) ; Gilkison v. Darlington, 123
Ind. App. 28, 106 N.E.2d 473 (1952). See Steinmetz v. G. H. Hammond Co., 167 Ind.
153, 78 N.E. 628 (1906). (City courts do not have equitable jurisdiction to set aside
a judgment.)
It is not clear whether a change of venue may be granted. Gilkison v. Darlington,
sutpra, declares that a change of venue and change of judge may be granted, but the
court immediately qualified this statement by noting that the protesting party had
waived any right to protest he may have had by appearing and answering without objection. While it is not clear that a change of venue may be taken, it appears that the
court favored such a rule, but any future court that wishes to negate this view may do
so by alluding to the qualifying language and reach an opposite result without overruling the case.
180. Majors v. Craig, 144 Ind. 39, 43 N.E. 3 (1895) ; Hollinger v. Reeme, 138 Ind.
363, 36 N.E. 1114 (1894) ; Branham v. Boruff, 82 Ind. App. 370, 145 N.E. 901 (1925).
181. Majors v. Craig, supra note 180; Hollinger v. Reeme, supra note 180.
182. Ibid. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 113 Ind. 131, 15 N.E. 223 (1888).
183. Hoilinger v. Reeme, 138 Ind. 363, 36 N.E. 1114 (1894) ; Wiley v. Pratt, 23 Ind.
628 (1864). Where the judgment is void, a meritorious defense need not be alleged.
Dobbins v. McNamara, 113 Ind. 54, 14 N.E. 887 (1888); Ward v. Ward, 117 Ind. App.
225, 71 N.E.2d 131 (1947). Contra, Schilling v. Quinn, 178 Ind. 443, 99 N.E. 740
(1912); Williams v. Hitzie, 83 Ind. 303 (1882).
184. Gilkison v. Darlington, 123 Ind. App. 28, 106 N.E.2d 473 (1952). Statutory
provisions do not affect the court's equitable jurisdiction to act, but courts of equity
will refuse to assume jurisdiction when the statutory remedy is adequate. Legal rights
against third parties do not prevent a court of equity from assuming jurisdiction. Hitt
v. Carr, 77 Ind. App. 488, 130 N.E. 1 (1921).
185. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Lundquist, 222 Ind. 359, 53 N.E.2d 338 (1943).
Equity will not grant relief when the rights of bona fide purchasers have intervened.
Majors v. Craig, 144 Ind. 39, 43 N.E. 3 (1895).
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should act is a question to be determined by the facts of each particular
18 6

case.

Equitable relief in Indiana takes two general forms. The first
enjoins enforcement of the judgment and the second sets aside the judgment and orders a new trial on the merits. The former is a much
stronger remedy in that it finally bars the judgment holder from exercising any rights he had under the judgment." ' The latter is not a complete bar because the judgment holder may prevail in the subsequent trial
and thereby regain some enforceable rights. Both remedies are separate
and independent proceedings and therefore require notice to adverse
parties. Both are direct attacks. 8 While it is true that equitable powers
extend to absolute injunction, in no case should the decree go beyond
the relief prayed for in the petition. 88 Where part of the judgment
appears just, the injunction should allow that part to stand while enjoining proceedings on the unjust portion.'
The absolute injunction is infrequently used since the mere vacation of judgment is usually adequate.
The only time limit on proceedings in equity is set by the doctrine
of laches,"'8 but the doctrine of equitable estoppel may serve to cut off
an equitable cause of action. To raise an equitable estoppel, the judgment holder, acting in good faith, must materially change his position in
0 2 An application to set aside or enjoin the
reliance on the judgment."
judgment can be initiated only by one who was a party to the original
suit or his successors. 8' The chief cause for granting equitable relief
is fraud in procurement of the judgment. The fraud must be practiced
by the prevailing party upon the opposite party; fraud between co186. Aetna Securities Co. v. Sickels, 120 Ind. App. 300, 88 N.E.2d 789 (1950).
187. Gilkison v. Darlington, 123 Ind. App. 28, 106 N.E.2d 473 (1952); Hitt v.
Carr, 77 Ind. App. 488, 130 N.E. 1 (1921).
188. Harman v. Moore, 112 Ind. 221, 13 N.E. 718 (1887) ; Gilkison v. Darlington,
supra note 187; Ayres v. Smith, 227 Ind. 82, 84 N.E.2d 185 (1948).
189. Gilkison v. Darlington, supra note 187.
190. Gilkison v. Darlington, 123 Ind. App. 28, 106 N.E.2d 473 (1952). But where
it is not clear what portion is just, the judgment should be set aside in toto. Gilkison v.
Darlington, supra.
191. Livingston v. Livingston, 190 Ind. 223, 130 N.E. 122 (1921); Nicholson v.
Nicholson, 113 Ind. 131, 15 N.E. 223.
The statute of limitations may serve to bar a cause of action, but it does not start
running until the grounds for equitable relief are discovered. Brake v. Payne, 137 Ind.
479, 37 N.E. 140 (1893). It would appear that a complaint barred by the statute of
limitations would have long been barred by laches.
192. Meyer v. Wilson, 166 Ind. 651, 76 N.E. 748 (1906); Brake v. Payne, mspra
note 191. Expense incurred in the issuance of the execution will not raise an estoppel.
Brake v. Payne, supra note 191.
193. Brokaw v. Brokaw, 99 Ind. App. 385, 192 N.E. 728 (1934). This rule seems
unjust. If the judgment works an unjust hardship on one whose legal interest is involved, he should be allowed to bring an action for equitable relief, regardless of
whether he was a party to the original suit or is in privity with an original litigant.
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defendants or co-plaintiffs will not affect the prevailing party's rights." 4
In proceedings to enjoin or vacate on grounds of fraud, the burden of
proof is on the applicant and the fraud must be proved affirmatively." 5
Fraud is divided into two categories. Conduct consisting of perjured testimony or introduction in evidence of a fraudulent instrument is
called intrinsic fraud.'96 Intrinsic fraud consists of matters which were
litigated and in which the fraudulent matter was before the court."'r It
is extrinsic fraud when the successful party has been prevented from
fully presenting his case by acts which result in a failure to put the issues
of the case in contest.9 " Only extrinsic fraud is grounds for equitable
relief. "99
' The rationale of this rule is that in intrinsic fraud the court is
being asked to retry an issue which should have been contested at the
original trial, whereas extrinsic fraud prevents the court from reaching
the merits of the case.2"0 However, there is a great difference between
recognizing perjury and proving its existence. Another objection to the
rule is its difficulty of application. To a certain degree, all fraudulent
acts affect the matters being litigated and all fraudulent acts influence
the court in its decision. It is difficult to defend on any logical grounds
what appears to be a purely arbitrary rule. It is unjust to have the result depend on the use of a label when intrinsic fraud is as culpable and
injurious as extrinsic fraud. It is submitted that a better test would be
to inquire whether, if the particular fraud had not occurred, there would
probably have been a different result. This preserves finality in a practical way, unlike the artificial rule concerning intrinsic fraud. The sug194. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Holmes, 69 Ind. 577 (1880). The rationale of this
rule is that the prevailing party's rights would be subverted without his fault and fraud
could be easily practiced by the co-parties for their own benefit. This reasoning cannot be sustained. The defrauded litigant is injured as greatly by the fraud of his coparty as he is by the fraud of its adversary. Further, the requirement of a meritorious
defense would greatly deter the utilization of fraud as a dilatory device. Certainly the
need to fill the gap left in this remedy by this rule is greater than is the interest of
preventing the unlikely event of co-parties using fraud against one another to "de-fraud"
their adversary.
195. Postal v. Postal, 192 Ind. 376, 136 N.E. 570 (1922) ; Himelstein Bros., Inc. v.
Texas Co., 125 Ind. App. 448, 125 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
196. Walker v. State ex rel. Laboyteaux, 43 Ind. App. 605, 86 N.E. 502 (1908);
Pepin v. Lautman, 28 Ind. App. 74, 62 N.E. 60 (1901).
197. Ibid.
198. Walker v. State cx rel. Laboyteaux, 43 Ind. App. 605, 86 N.E. 502 (1908).
199. Brake v. Payne, 137 Ind. 479, 37 N.E. 140 (1893) ; Johnson's Adm'r v. Unversaw, 30 Ind. 435 (1868) ; Pepin v. Lautman, 28 Ind. App. 74, 62 N.E. 60 (1901).
200. Pepin v. Lautman, supra note 199. "The party present at the trial must be
prepared to meet and expose perjury, because he must know that in no other way can
a false claim be supported, and the purpose of the trial is to ascertain the truth, and that
in doing so the court must determine the truth or falsity of the testimony given." Pepin
v. Lautman, 28 Ind. App. 74, 77, 62 N.E. 60, 61 (1908).
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gested standard would allow courts more freedom to aid a defrauded litigant and still not require performance of a useless act.
Fraud for which the court will grant relief is usually designated as
fraud in procurement of the judgment.2"' Included in this category is
fraud in obtaining jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction is acquired by fraud,
the judgment may be attacked by a complaint in equity." 2 Void judgments are proper grounds for attack under equitable proceedings. 02
Earlier cases indicate that newly discovered evidence is a proper ground
for equitable relief, but no recent cases have been found on this point. 0 4
This may be due to the statutory remedies now available.20 2 Since equitable relief also requires due diligence in discovering the new evidence,
few situations would justify granting relief after three years had expired. Until then the legal remedy is adequate.20 0 However, review of
judgment for material new matter requires stronger evidence than a complaint for new trial for newly discovered evidence.20 7 Therefore, in cases
where the evidence is discovered after one year and is thus not grounds
for complaint for new trial, and it also cannot be characterized as material
new matter but is considered newly discovered evidence, the evidence
might be grounds for equitable relief. But the possibility seems slight in
view of the lack of precedent and the argument that the legislature impliedly abrogated this form of relief by enacting a statute providing for
a complaint for new trial, thereby formulating the policy that no judgment should be set aside on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
after the expiration of one year.20 '
201. Friebe v. Elder, 181 Ind. 597, 105 N.E. 151 (1914) ; Miedreich v. Lauenstein,
172 Ind. 140, 86 N.E. 963 (1909). Fraud which would have amounted to a defense to
the original cause is not cause for setting aside the judgment. Ferrara v. Genduso, 214
Ind. 99, 14 N.E.2d 580 (1938).
202. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, supra note 201; Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380
(1882). See Cully v. Shirk, 131 Ind. 76, 30 N.E. 882 (1892).
203. Traders Loan and Investment Co. v. Houchins, 195 Ind. 256, 144 N.E. 879
(1924) ; Brown v. Goble, 97 Ind. 86 (1884). But where the judgment is not void, although no actual notice was received, equitable relief will not be granted. Thus, in absence of fraud, a false return of summons does not constitute grounds for equitable
relief. Friebe v. Elder, 181 Ind. 597, 105 N.E. 151 (1914) ; Graham v. Loh, 32 Ind. App.
183, 69 N.E. 474 (1904). Here the proper remedy is application for relief for excusable
neglect, etc. Nietert v. Trentman, 104 Ind. 390, 4 N.E. 306 (1885). See note 11 supra
and accompanying text.
204. See Thompson v. Adams, 2 Ind. 151 (1850) ; Mason v. Palmerton, 2 Ind. 117
(1850) ; Fitch v. Polke, 7 Blackf. 564 (Ind. 1845).
205. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2405 (Burns 1946) (complaint for new trial) and
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2605 (Burns 1946) (Review of judgment for material new matter).
206. Ibid.
207. See notes 108 and 165 supra and accompanying text.
208. However, the validity of this argument can be questioned by reference to the
fact that the complaint for new trial grants relief on grounds of extrinsic fraud and
this has not deterred the court from affording equitable relief on the same grounds.

NOTES
Judicial error is not a ground for equitable relief." 9 But where a
litigant's right of appeal is hindered or destroyed through an error of an
officer of the court, such as destruction of the trial record, equity will
grant relief."' A new trial will be ordered only when the proposed appeal involves questions that cannot be determined without the evidence
and when a general bill of exceptions containing this evidence cannot be
procured in any other manner.2 1' Whether the questions to be raised on
appeal are of such a nature is a question of fact to be determined by the
trial court.212 Equity will relieve a party from a judgment entered as a
result of the mutual mistake of the parties and the officers of the
court.2"2 An execution that is sought to be levied on a satisfied judgment
will be enjoined, as will an execution on a judgment where payment has
been tendered and refused. 4 But a litigant who has mistaken his legal
rights and therefore fails to assert a defense that was competent, is not
entitled to equitable relief on grounds of mistake.215
The remedy available in equitable proceedings is stronger than
statutory relief because of the power of absolute injunction and lack of a
fixed time limit. For these reasons the court is cautious in granting
relief. This is as it should be; were it otherwise, the statutory remedies
would be void of significance and purpose. Equitable proceedings should
grant relief in situations not covered by statutory remedy and where
extreme injustice would exist if relief was not granted; but in view of
the lack of a definite time limit and the potential strength of this valuable
remedy, the courts should exercise restraint in asserting their equitable
powers.
See note 111 supra and accompanying text. Also, void judgments constitute grounds for

relief for excusable neglect, etc. and review of judgments. See notes 10 and 144 supra.
209. Wohaldo v. Fary, 221 Ind. 219, 46 N.E.2d 489 (1943) ; Rhodes Burford Furniture Co. v. Mattox, 135 Ind. 372, 34 N.E. 326 (1893) (wrong number of jurors) ; Martin
v. Pifer, 96 Ind. 245 (1884) (verdict rendered on insufficient evidence). Clerical errors
are not grounds for equitable relief because the legal remedy is adequate. See note 30
supra and accompanying text.
210. Indianapolis Life Ins. v. Lundquist, 222 Ind. 359, 53 N.E.2d 338 (1943) ; King
v. King, 119 Ind. App. 46, 82 N.E.2d 527 (1948) ; Hitt v. Carr, 77 Ind. App. 488, 130

N.E. 1 (1921).
211. King v. King, supra note 210.
212. Ibid.
213. Livengood v. Munns, 108 Ind. App. 27, 27 N.E.2d 92 (1940).
214. Bowen v. Clark, 46 Ind. 405 (1874).
215. Murphy v. Blair, 12 Ind. 184 (1859) ; Dickerson v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 6 Ind.
128 (1855). But where one is fraudulently prevented from asserting a defense, equity
will grant relief. Johnson's Adm'r v. Unversaw, 30 Ind. 435 (1868). Where one is
defrauded after a compromise, and thereby prevented from asserting a legal defense, it
is proper grounds for equitable relief. Greenwaldt v. May, 127 Ind. 511, 27 N.E. 158
(1890) ; Nealis v. Dicks, 72 Ind. 374 (1880) ; Cory v. Howard, 88 Ind. App. 503, 164
N.E. 639 (1928). But see Mitchell v. Boyer, 58 Ind. 19 (1877). Where a party allows
a judgment to be taken against him on the promise that his opponent will never issue
execution, equity will not intercede.
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The Federal Rules provide similar relief by Rules 60(b) (3) and
60(b) (5). The former provides for vacating judgments on grounds of
fraud.216 The motion must be made within a reasonable time and in any
event not later than one year from the date of judgment.21 7 As in Indiana, a motion to vacate on grounds of fraud must be made in the court
that rendered the original judgment.2 1 A meritorious defense must also
be shown under Federal Rule 60(b) (3).219

The rule on extrinsic and

intrinsic fraud is specifically abrogated.22 Rule 60(b) (3) is applicable
only to fraud perpetrated by the adverse party. 21 Relief from fraud on
the part of a third person should be sought under Rule 60(b) (6), by
an independent action in equity, or possibly on the ground of fraud on
the court.222 Rule 60(b) (5) provides for relief where the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged. There is no time limit under
this section other than a reasonable time.222
Independent equitable proceedings are also available in the federal
courts. 4 It is substantially the same action as the one available in
Indiana. The intrinsic-extrinsic fraud dichotomy is still in effect under
the federal equitable proceeding. 2 5 Another remedy available in the
federal courts which is comparable to the Indiana equitable proceeding,
is relief based on fraud on the court.22 It recognizes an inherent power
in any court against which fraud was perpetrated to vacate a judgment
22
so procured.

The court may act upon the motion of an injured lit222

gant,228 an interested third person,
or on its own motion. 2 ' Here
there is no attempt to classify fraud as extrinsic or intrinsic.2 ' There is
no fixed time limitation,2 "2 nor is laches a defense." 2 Fraud on the court
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3). See Note, 3 DUKE B.J. 40 (1952).
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
218. United States ex rel. Aigner v. Shaughnessy, 175 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1949).
See note 179 supra and accompanying text.
219. Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1947).
220. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3).
221. See 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.25 [5] (2d ed. 1955).
222. Ibid.
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
224. Ibid. See Note, 3 DUKE B.J. 40 (1952).
225. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878). But see Marshall v.
Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). This case casts serious doubt on the validity of the rule,
but did not expressly overrule the former case. See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.37
[1] (2d ed. 1955).
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322

U.S. 238 (1944). See Note, 3 DuKE B.J. 40 (1952).
227. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., supra note 226.
228. Ibid.

229. Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1948).

230. Ibid.
231. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
232. See note 229 supra.
233. See note 231 supra.

NOTES

must involve an officer of the court such as a judge, attorney, or juror.""
No such remedy appears to exist in Indiana, although similar relief may
be obtained under independent equitable proceedings and complaint for
new trial."'
The Federal Rules, in conjunction with the supplementary actions of
independent proceedings in equity and fraud on the court, furnish a
much broader basis for relief than the Indiana equitable proceedings.
The chief reason for this is the elimination by 60(b) (3) of the rule
precluding relief when the asserted ground was intrinsic fraud. This
represents a most desirable innovation in the law.
Ancillary Remedies
Federal Rule 60(b) has abolished the ancient ancillary remedies of
coram nobis, audita querela, bill of review and bills in the nature of bill
of review, but the substantive relief formerly embodied in these remedies
has been retained." 6 These remedies have never been expressly abolished
in Indiana, but, as under the Federal Rules, the relief obtainable through
thse remedies is now largely accorded by statutory procedures.
Coram nobis 37 is a common law writ which granted relief from
judgments for error of fact. It permitted the court to set aside its
judgment which was made while some fact existed, that, had it been
before the court, would have prevented rendition of the judgment. As
applied to civil judgments in Indiana it has been superceded by the statutes which provide relief from judgments taken through excusable neglect, etc.,23 review of judgments for material new matter,3" complaint
for new trial for newly discovered evidence,24 and equitable relief. 4
Audita querela242 is another common law writ that accorded relief
from judgments for error of fact. It is very similar to the writ of coram
nobis and the distinction is often ignored by the courts. The writ provides for vacation of judgment when the party was prejudiced by a
234. See 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.33 (2d ed. 1955).
235. See notes 111 and 201 supra and accompanying text.
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
237. See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 256 (5th ed. 1925) ; 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 60.14 (2d ed. 1955) ; ORFIELD, Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 8 IND. L.J. 247 (1933) ;
THORNTON, Coram Nobis et Coram Vobis, 5 IND. L.J. 603 (1930) ; ORFIELD, Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice,20 VA. L. REv. 423 (1933).
238. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1068 (Burns 1946) ; see note 1 supra and accompanying
section.

239. IND. ANN.
ing text.
240. IND. ANN.
text.

STAT.

§ 2-2605 (Burns 1946) ; see note 134 supra and accompany-

STAT. § 2-2405 (Burns 1946)

; see note 92 supra and accompanying

241. See note 176 supra and accompanying section.
242. See 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 246, § 257; 7 MooRE, op. cit. supra note
237, § 60.13.
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wrongful act of his adversary and for matters of fact arising after rendition of the judgment which would have been a good defense to the action had they occurred before the judgment was rendered. It is doubtful
if the writ of audita querela ever existed under Indiana law. The substance of the remedy is available to litigants in the form of equitable
relief, the material new matter portion of review of judgment, and a
complaint for new trial.
Bills of review24 and bills in the nature of bills of review244 were
equitable remedies which provided relief from judgment for errors of
law, newly discovered evidence, new matters of fact occurring after the
decree has been entered, and fraud. Historically these remedies applied
only to equitable decrees. A bill of review may be brought only by the
original parties or their privies whose interests have been affected by
the decree; a bill in the nature of a bill of review may be brought by
anyone other than the original parties or their privies whose interests
have been affected by the decree. 45 The substance of these remedies was
adopted in Indiana by statutes for review of judgment, complaint for
new trial, and equitable relief.
There was no time limit under these ancillary remedies
except laches.
Since these remedies have never been expressly abrogated, it is theoretically possible that they are available to the person whose meritorious cause
for relief is barred under the present statutory remedies because of the
lapse of time or for some other reason. The strongest possibility would
be coram nobis because it is used to attack criminal judgments and has
never been specifically forbidden to a litigant in a civil action. Audita
querela probably would not be available as a method of attack because it
seems to have been a stranger to Indiana law. Relief is not likely to be
granted through bills of reviews; since the statutory remedy of review
of judgment evolved directly from this remedy. An extremely strong
argument could be made that bills of review were impliedly abolished.
As for coram nobis, while an argument for its use might be plausible, it
is submitted that in view of the many statutory remedies available it
probably would not be well received by the courts.
Conclusion
The law on judgments in Indiana is represented by many statutory
and equitable remedies. Each has its own rules and its own time limits.
243. See 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 237, § 60.15.
244. Ibid.
245. Another distinction sometimes advanced is that bills of review sought to attack a properly enrolled decree, while a bill in the nature of a bill of review sought to
attack a decree that had not'been properly enrolled. 7 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 237, §

60.15 [1].

NOTES
They are scattered throughout the statute books and the common law
with no thread of centralization or continuity. The present statutory
remedies have sprung from different sources and have evolved independently; consequently, many areas overlap and others are not adequately provided for. There is great need for compilation and centralization. Through careful consolidation an area presently replete with conflicts and gaps could be resolved into an efficient, comprehensive body
of law. The law germane to vacation of judgments in Indiana has
various time limits governing its applicability. When the interests involved are as nebulous as the ones dealt with here, setting a fixed time
limit amounts to little more than guesswork.24 Therefore, the real problem is to determine the most effective method by which litigation may be
terminated and still preserve maximum freedom to the courts to correct
injustice. It is submitted that this principle could best be attained
through the elimination of fixed time limits and the use of a reasonable
time as a standard. 4 The fixed statutory time limits protect against
unnecessary delay by imposing the requirement of diligence but fail to
provide for the occasional extreme cases that go uncorrected. A reasonable time limit furnishes safeguards on both sides of the scale. It is
not sufficient to argue that the reasonable time limit would unduly burden the judgment holder because he would never be sure that the matter
has been brought to an end. The courts should consider the hardship a
vacation would impose on the judgment holder as one of the circumstances in deciding whether to set aside the judgment; however, the
policy underlying finality of judgments is not primarily the protection
of the judgment holder but a societal interest aimed at securing an end
to litigation.
The Federal Rules provide for relief on motion; under the Indiana
procedure the applicant must proceed by complaint. It is submitted that
the federal rule offers a more flexible and expeditious method of
handling pleas for relief. Proceedings on motion have several advantages over the complaint. First, bearing in mind that finality is a desirable policy and that just claims should be adjudicated and disposed of
as rapidly as possible, hearing on motion allows the courts to dispose of
246.

Such a practice admits that justice must be denied in some case, but that this

concession is justified by the benefits that accrue to society by securing an end to litigation.
247. Admittedly this condemns the present fixed time limits as being too short in
some cases and moves the balance away from finality toward justice in the individual
situations. However, the decree of the shift is slight, as illustrated by the cases dealing
with equitable relief. By use of a reasonable time limit it is assumed that the longer
the lapse between judgment and prayer for relief the stronger the circumstances in favor of the applicant must be.
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claims more quickly. Secondly, proceedings on motion allow the court
to definitely retain jurisdiction over the parties.248
It is suggested that the above recommendations would result in a
more effective and clearer procedure of attacking judgments. Consolidation especially would have an advantageous effect. It would benefit
both judgment holders and applicants in clarifying the law. Consolidation would restrict ill-defined causes of action, thereby protecting finality,
and would afford clear relief to claimants who have set out meritorious
causes.

THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN INDIANA: AN
EVALUATION OF PRESENT STANDARDS
A motion for a directed verdict, properly viewed, tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain each of the ultimate propositions
which collectively constitute the cause of action or defense that the proponent has asserted.' A proponent attempts to prove these ultimate
248. By requiring a complaint, the court must again obtain jurisdiction over the
parties before it can proceed with the hearing. This might prove difficult in some
cases. For example, where one who prevailed in the original cause has left the state or
where he was a non-resident and sued in an Indiana court, the applicant who has a valid
cause for relief might be defeated on jurisdictional grounds. Gavit contends that jurisdiction may be obtained by publication in these situations, the action being in rem with

the judgment the res. 2

GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRAcvicE

§ 216(c)

(1942).

This reasoning is supported in Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., 108 Ind. App. 401,
27 N.E.2d 917 (1940). This case allowed notice by publication in an action under Burns
2-1068, but the question was not raised or discussed by the court.
1. "Our procedure and practice do not recognize the right of a defendant to require
the withdrawal of a case from the jury by a motion for a nonsuit." Diamond Block Coal
Co. v. Edmonson, 14 Ind. App. 594, 595, 43 N.E. 242, 243 (1896) ; City of Plymouth v.
Milner, 117 Ind. 324, 20 N.E. 235 (1888). But if the defendant seeks to make an attack
upon the evidence supporting one of several allegations in a complaint, the proper
procedure is to request the court to withdraw that issue from the consideration of the
jury, rather than to request a directed verdict. In New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Verkins,
125 Ind. App. 320, 122 N.E.2d 141 (1954), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was
negligent in three particulars; high and dangerous rate of speed, failure to give a warning,
and failure to keep a lookout. The defendant tendered what appears to be a peremptory
instruction in his favor on the later allegation, but the Appellate court treated the
instruction as one to withdraw the issue from the jury and held that it was error for the
trial court to refuse this motion when there was no evidence to support the issue. See
Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125 Ind. App. 510, 124 N.E.2d 704 (1955). If the paragraphs
of the complaint state different causes of action, the proper motion to attack one
paragraph is the request for a directed verdict. Hamling v. Hildebrandt, 119 Ind. App.
22, 81 N.E.2d 603 (1948) ; Chicago, S.S. & S.B, R.R. Co. v. Pacheco, 94 Ind. App. 353,
181 N.E. 7 (1932).
Evidence is not categorically divided or compartmentalized into the ultimate propositions that such evidence is adduced to prove. Chacker v. Marcus, 119 Ind. App. 672,
86 N.E.2d 708 (1949). In determining whether the ultimate propostions have been

